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KANT ON THE ‘GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE’ AND 
THE IDEAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
Lucas THORPE 
ABSTRACT 
The ideal of the United Nations was first put forward by Immanuel Kant in his 1795 
essay Perpetual Peace. Kant, in the tradition of Locke and Rousseau is a liberal who 
believes that relations between individuals can either be based upon law and consent 
or upon force and violence. One way that such the ideal of world peace could be 
achieved would be through the creation of a single world state, of which every 
human being was a citizen. Such an ideal was advocated by a number of eighteenth 
century liberals. Kant, however, rejects this ideal and instead argues that the 
universal rule of law can be achieved through the establishment a federation of 
independent states. I examine the relevance of Kant’s arguments today, focusing on 
two questions: Firstly, as advocates of the rule of law, why advocate a federation of 
independent nations rather than a single world state. Secondly, is this ideal 
realizable? Is Kant right to think that republics are natural and are likely to live 
peacefully with one another? Kant’s arguments on this issue have been taken up 
again in recent decades by defenders of the theory of the “democratic peace”, the 
theory that democracies are more likely to live at peace with one another. 
Keywords: Kant, Hobbes, Peace, War, International Law 
 
KANT, EBEDİ BARIŞIN GARANTİSİ ve BİRLEŞMİŞ 
MİLLETLER İDEALİ ÜZERİNE 
ÖZET 
Birleşmiş Milletler ideali ilk olarak İmmanuel Kant’ın 1795 yılında yazdığı Ebedi 
Barış adlı makalesinde ortaya konmuştur. Kant, liberal gelenekten gelen Locke ve 
Rousseau gibi, bireyler arasındaki ilişkinin ya hukuk ve rıza yoluyla ya da güç veya 
şiddet üzerinden kurulabileceğine inanır. Bu türden bir dünya barışı idealine 
ulaşılabilmesinin yollarından biri, her bir insanın vatandaşı olduğu tek bir dünya 
devletinin yaratılmasıdır. Bu türden bir ideal 18. yüzyıl liberallerinin bir kaçı 
tarafından savunulmuştur. Kant, bu ideali reddedetmekle birlikte evrensel hukuk 
yasalarına, bağımsız bir devletler federasyonun kurulmasıyla ulaşılabileceğini 
savunur. Bu yazıda Kant’ın bu konudaki argümanlarının günümüzdeki geçerliliğine 
bakacağım. Bunu yaparken iki soru üzerine odaklanacağım: Birinci olarak, hukuk 
yasalarının bir savunucusu olarak, Kant’ın neden tek bir dünya devletini seçmek 
yerine bağımsız devletler federasyonunu seçtiği. İkinci olarak, bu 
gerçekleştirilebilecek bir ideal midir? Kant, cumhuriyet devletlerinin doğal olduğu 
ve barış içinde birbirleriyle yaşayabilecekleri yönünde ortaya koyduğu 
argümanlarında haklı mıdır? Kant’ın bu konudaki argümanları, demokratik 
devletlerin birbirleriyle barış içinde yaşamalarının daha muhtemel olduğunu kabul 
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eden “demokratik barış” teorisi savunucuları tarafından günümüzde tekrar 
kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. 
Keywords: Kant, Hobbes, Barış, Savaş, Uluslararası Hukuk 
 
The Foundation of the United Nations and Perpetual Peace 
The United Nations was founded at the end of the second world war with the 
primary goal of establishing world peace and international security. The 
Preamble to the Charter, signed in June 26 1945 in San Fransisco by 
representatives of 50 Nations, states the following : 
WE THE PEOPE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
DETERMINED  
 to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in our lifetime has bought untold sorrow to 
mankind, and 
 to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small, and 
 to establish conditions under which justice and respect 
for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained, and 
 to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom 
This preamble makes it clear that the primary aim of the United 
Nations was, and is, the maintenance of international peace and security.  
But it is also determined to (a) support human rights, (b) maintain 
international law and (c) promote economic development. These three 
activities should not be seen as separate and independent goals but were and 
should be regarded as integral to the achievement of the primary aim of 
achieving international peace and security.1 
This ideal of a United Nations was not new. It was first put forward 
exactly 150 years before the charter was signed by the German philosopher, 
Immanuel Kant in his essay Perpetual Peace which was published in 1795. 
In this essay Kant argues that, “[n]ations, as states, can be appraised as 
                                                 
1 In addition it should be noted that the preamble not only affirms the rights of 
individuals, but also the rights of states, and this notion of states as well as human 
individuals as having rights is reaffirmed in the second article that stresses that the 
“organization is based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
members”. 
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individuals, who in their natural condition (that is, in their independence 
from external laws) already wrong one another by being near one another; 
and each of them, for the sake of its security, can and ought to require the 
others to enter with it into a constitution similar to a civil constitution, in 
which each can be assured of its right. This would be a league of nations, 
which, however, need not be a state of nations” (1996, 8:353, pp.325-6, 
emphasis added).2 And I believe that the ideal we find presented in the 
preamble including the understanding of the relationship between the 
primary goal (peace) and the three subsidiary goals is essentially the ideal 
put forward by Kant. For, as we shall see, Kant argues that in order to 
promote world peace we must (a) encourage a respect for human rights, (b) 
maintain international law and promote the development of international 
institutions and (c) promote economic development 
  For Kant, the idea of world at peace is both a moral ideal and 
something he considers to be a realistic and achievable goal. I will begin in 
the first half of this paper by examining the way in which Kant thinks of 
peace as a moral ideal. I will then discuss the degree to which it is a 
realizable ideal, especially in the 21st century. In a central section of the 
essay, Kant introduces the idea of what he calls a “guarantee” of perpetual 
peace. Kant’s claim here is often read as having to do with the historical 
inevitability of perpetual peace. I will argue, in contrast, that Kant’s aim in 
appealing to a “guarantee” of perpetual peace is merely to demonstrate the 
real possibility of perpetual peace. I will conclude the paper by briefly 
discussing, and rejecting, a Kantian case for liberal interventionism and 
regime change.  
World Peace as a Moral Ideal 
For Kant and, 17th and 18th Century liberals in general, peace is the political 
ideal: to live in peace with others involves more than not being engaged in 
open conflict but for one’s relations with others to be based upon law and 
right rather than upon violence or the threat of violence. Hobbes makes this 
point very clearly in Leviathan: “For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell only, 
or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherin the Will to contend by 
Battell is sufficiently known. . . So the nature of War, consisteth not in  
actuall fighting; but in all know disposition thereto. . . All other time is 
                                                 
2 And he continues by adding that the idea of a state of nations “would be a 
contradiction, inasmuch as every state involves the relation of a superior 
(legislating) to an inferior (obeying, namely the people); but a number of nations 
within one state would constitute only one nation, and this contradicts the 
presupposition (since here we have to consider the right of nations in relation to one 
another insofar as they comprise different states and are not to be fused into a single 
state)” (ibid.). 
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PEACE.” (Hobbes, p.185). And Hobbes believed that peace, defined in these 
terms, was only possible between individuals, be they individual human 
beings or states, if they were governed by public law. War is essentially a 
form of lawlessness. In this point all the major classical liberals, including 
Kant, were in agreement. Peace and law go hand in hand. The main focus of 
disagreement between them was on the nature of law and how it can be 
instituted.3 
Kant was a strong universalist, believing that the ultimate moral 
community includes the whole of humanity. Thus, his ideal is that the 
relations between all human beings should be governed by law and not by 
force, for ultimately the human race constitutes a single society and hence 
the ideal legal system is one that encompasses all human beings. Now one 
way that such an ideal could be achieved would be through the creation of a 
single world state, of which every human being was a citizen. And such an 
ideal, of a world state, was advocated by a number of eighteenth century 
liberals, most famously by the Abbe Saint Pierre,  who believed that for the 
whole human race to be ruled by law, there would have to be a single 
universal law and hence a world state.4 Kant, however, rejects this ideal and 
instead argues that the universal rule of law can only be achieved through the 
establishment of a league of nations, or a world federation of independent 
sovereign states living at peace with one another. Thus Kant’s understanding 
of a peaceful global order involves a two-tier concept of law. We have 
national law which governs the relations between citizens within a state, and 
international law which governs the relationship between states. 
International law on this conception is not thought of as protecting or 
determining the rights of individuals, but merely as regulating the 
relationship between states.5 
Now Kant rejects the idea of a world state not merely because he 
believes that such a state would be impossible to achieve, but also because 
the notion of a world state is ultimately undesirable. He has two main 
reasons for suggesting that a world state is unachievable. Firstly he is 
committed to the idea that the rule of law is something that can only be done 
                                                 
3 Kant, then, in the tradition of Locke and Rousseau is liberal who believes that 
relations between individuals can either be based upon law and consent or upon 
force and violence and his liberal ideal is the idea of a world of individuals living at 
peace with one another and he believes that this is only possible in a society 
governed by law. 
4 Such was the position of the Abbé Saint Pierre in his “Project for making perpetual 
peace in Europe” (1715), and given the title of Kant’s essay, it is clear that he had 
the position of the Abbé in mind in this work. 
5 International law, then, should be distinguished from what Kant calls 
‘cosmopolitan law’ which has to do with how nation-states relate to non-citizens.  
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on the small scale, and that the larger the state the weaker the law. This is a 
claim proposed by Rousseau, and it is likely that Kant if following Rousseau 
in this. Such a presupposition may have been uncontestable in the 1790s, 
given the speed of communications at those times, however it is less 
plausible in the modern world with near instantaneous communications. 
Secondly, however, Kant argues that cultural differences, and here he 
specifically, mentions religious and linguistic difference, make the 
achievement of such a global state impossible, as such state would likely be 
unstable.6 His assumption seems to be that a certain homogeneity of citizens 
is necessary for the unity and stability of a republic. Once again, however, 
political experience since the time of Kant may offer some evidence against 
such a claim, for there do seem to be large multi-ethnic states that seem to be 
relatively stable. The USA seems one example of such a non-culturally 
homogeneous democracy. Although there is a single national language, and 
one may wonder about its long-run stability.7 Perhaps an even stronger 
example of a non-culturally homogenous modern democracy is 
contemporary India where there is neither a shared single religion, nor a 
shared single language. But once again, it is not clear how stable 
multicultural India is.   
The previous two concerns are about the potential stability of a 
global state. However, in addition to being worried that a stable global state 
is unrealizable, Kant also argues that a single world state would not itself be 
desirable. Firstly a single world state will lack the economic virility of a 
federation of competing sovereign states8 and secondly, and more 
importantly he believes that a world state would ultimately be despotic and 
crush freedom. Thus he argues that:  
                                                 
6 Thus he argues that “Yet the craving of every state (or of its head) is to attain a 
lasting condition of peace in this way, by ruling the whole world where possible. But 
nature wills it otherwise. It makes use of two means to prevent peoples from 
intermingling and to separate them: differences of language and of religion” (1996, 
8:367, p.336) 
7 Thus Neil Gross (2018) wonders “if trust in American democracy is eroding 
because the nation has become too big to be effectively governed through traditional 
means? With a population of more than 325 million and an enormously complex 
society, perhaps this country has passed a point where — no matter whom we elect 
— it risks becoming permanently dissatisfied with legislative and governmental 
performance.” I thank an anonymous referee to drawing the work of Neil Gross to 
my attention.  
8 He also suggests that a world system of peacefully co-existing republics would be 
more vigorous than a single world empire. Thus he argues that, unlike a “universal 
despotism that saps all man’s energies and ends in the graveyard of freedom,” the 
sort of world federation he envisions “is created and guaranteed by an equilibrium of 
forces and a most vigorous rivalry.” (1996, 8:367, p.336) 
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The idea of the right of nations presupposes the separation of 
many neighboring states independent of one another; and 
though such a condition is of itself a condition of war (unless a 
federative union of them prevents the outbreak of hostilities), 
this is nevertheless better, in accordance with the idea of reason, 
than the fusion of them by one power overgrowing the rest and 
passing into a universal monarchy, since as the range of 
government expands laws progressively lose their vigor, and a 
soulless despotism, after it has destroyed the seed of good, 
finally deteriorates into anarchy. (1996, 8:367, p.336) 
Such a single world state, Kant suggests, would not ultimately lead 
to the rule of law but to world despotism. So Kant’s primary worry about the 
idea of a global state is not ultimately about the feasibility of such an idea, 
but its desirability.  
World Peace as a Realistic Goal 
So Kant’s moral ideal is of a world of free and independent sovereign 
republics living at peace with one another. But he also argues that it is a 
realistic goal that we can hope to achieve. Indeed he argues that world peace 
is both a moral goal that any moral statesman should work towards and a 
state of affairs that could even by realized by a world of devils dominated 
purely by self-interest.  
In International Relations, as a discipline, there is a sharp divide 
between realists, who believe that states are self-interested, power-seeking 
rational actors and that any cooperation between them can only be accidental 
and idealists, who believe that states can mutually gain from cooperation and 
that the international rule of law is both realizable and desirable. Kant is 
often regarded as the arch idealist and he clearly believes that we and our 
politicians, have a moral duty to do what we can to establish a lawful world 
order. However, there are strong realist, even Hobbesian strains in Kant’s 
thought, for he also believes that “[t]he problem of establishing a state, no 
matter how hard it may sound, is soluble even for a nation of devils (if only 
they have understanding)” (1996, 8:360, p.335) For “the problem is not the 
moral improvement of human beings but only the mechanism of nature, and 
what the task requires one to know is how this can be put to use in human 
beings in order so to arrange the conflict of their unpeaceable dispositions 
within a people that they themselves have to constrain one another to submit 
to coercive law and so bring about a condition of peace in which laws have 
force.” (ibid.). And he adds that we can see such a principle working not just 
between individuals, but also between states.  
Kant hopes to show us that many of the aspects of human nature that 
tend to lead to war and conflict are precisely those elements that also ground 
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the possibility of peaceful co-existence. In this aspect of his project Kant is 
clearly walking in the footsteps of that arch realist Hobbes. Hobbes had 
argued in Leviathan that the primary cause of conflict and war between 
individuals is the (reasonable) desire all of us have to be able to satisfy our 
goals both in the present and in the future. Thus, Hobbes famously claimed 
that “in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a 
perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in 
death.” (Hobbes, p. 66). Hobbes is often misinterpreted here as claiming that 
human beings are primarily driven by a desire to dominate others, with this 
desire to dominate others being the major source of conflict between 
individuals. Now, while Hobbes clearly does not deny that human beings are 
often driven by a desire for glory and domination, this is not the point he is 
making here with this claim about the restless desire for power. For Hobbes 
is careful in his use of words, and explicitly defines ‘power’ at the very start 
of the previous chapter, where he argues that “[t]he POWER of a man, (to 
take it universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent 
good.” (Hobbes, p.58). Thus this should make it clear that what Hobbes calls 
the ceaseless desire for power over power just means the desire to ensure 
that we can achieve our goals both in the present and in the future. Each 
individual desires to satisfy not only their present desires but also to secure 
the means to satisfy their desires in the future. And in a world of limited 
resources, without public law this can only lead to conflict. Thus, as Hobbes 
famously argues, the state of nature, and by this Hobbes means the way 
things would be before law is instituted, is a state of war, and in such a state 
the life of man would be “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.” (Hobbes, 
p.84)  
Hobbes believes, however, that the same natural facts about humans 
that lead us to conflict are also those elements of human nature that promote 
peace, for we can all recognize that the best way of achieving our interests is 
to live at peace with our neighbors, and that the only way we can do this is if 
we are willing to give up some of our claims if others are willing to do the 
same. It is rational, then, to submit to a law that forces us to renounce some 
of our desires on the understanding that our neighbors will do the same. But 
this, Hobbes thinks, is only possible given the existence of public law. Now 
once such law in in place, some of us might obey it for moral reasons, but if 
this doesn’t do the job cold-hearted selfish rational calculation will. Kant 
takes this analysis and applies it to the sphere of international relations 
between states rather than the relations between human individuals, and, 
perhaps surprisingly for those who know a little about Hobbes and Kant and 
were taught that they represent two different ends of the scale, Kant agrees 
with Hobbes that the natural relations between states is one of war. Thus he 
argues that:  
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A condition of peace among men living near one another is not 
a state of nature (status naturalis), which is much rather a 
condition of war, that is, it involves the constant threat of an 
outbreak of hostilities even if this does not always occur. A 
condition of peace must therefore be established; for suspension 
of hostilities is not yet assurance of peace, and unless such 
assurance is afforded one neighbor by another (as can happen 
only in a lawful condition), the former, who has called upon the 
latter for it, can treat him as an enemy (1996, 8:349-50, p.322) 
Thus Kant agrees with Hobbes that peace and law are not natural but 
need to be established or instituted. The state of nature, for Kant, like 
Hobbes, is a state of war. Now, Hobbes believed that the only way that the 
state of peace can be established is through the introduction of an absolute 
sovereign. Kant, however, believes that the existence of law does not require 
the existence of a sovereign, and this is why he thinks that global peace is 
possible without the existence of a global state. Rather than being guaranteed 
by the will of a sovereign, Kant instead argues that “[w]hat affords this 
guarantee (surety) is nothing less than the great artist nature” (1996, 8:361. 
331)  
Now many scholars have misunderstood Kant’s claim here. 
Suggesting that when Kant talks of a “guarantee” here he is making a claim 
about the historical origin of such a perpetual peace, claiming that somehow 
nature guarantees that a peaceful world of republics will eventually emerge. 
Thus, for example Luigi Caranti argues that “[i]n his political writings Kant 
often claims that the achievement of a condition of perpetual peace among 
nations is guaranteed by nature” (p.611), and he suggests this should be 
thought of as a “prediction concerning human history” (p. 612).9 By 
‘guaranteed’ here Kant does not mean ‘made inevitable’ and he is not 
offering a prediction about how human history will unfold. Instead he is 
concerned with offering an account not of the emergence of perpetual peace, 
but of its possibility.  And there are at least two important reasons why we 
may doubt the possibility of perpetual peace, and the idea of nature as 
providing a “guarantee” is meant to address these worries about the 
possibility of perpetual peace.  
The first worry is more political. For, as Wolfgan Ertl has pointed 
out, Kant’s text is 
modelled on peace treaties and in a sense is meant to provide 
the ideal peace treaty – not restricted to particular wars, but 
addressing the cessation of war as such – the powers in charge 
                                                 
9 See also Ypi (2010),  
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of this guarantee are not of the usual sort. In ordinary peace 
treaties the guarantor powers try to ensure compliance with the 
terms of the treaty by virtue of threatening sanctions if the 
parties concerned disobeyed. (p. 2540)  
So one worry concerning the possibility of lasting peace, rather than 
merely a period of time with no fighting, is that real peace requires 
something like a treaty and a treaty normally requires a guarantor, and it is 
not clear who or what could act as guarantor for the sort of perpetual peace 
that Kant hopes for, especially in the absence of a world sovereign. Kant’s 
suggestion, is that rather than a particular party acting as a guarantor, the 
three conditions previously mentioned could themselves guarantee such a 
peace. And because these conditions could come about naturally it makes 
sense to say that in such a case the peace would be guaranteed by nature.  
The second worry is more theoretical and involves Kant’s 
understanding of what is involved the idea of something being universally 
the case rather than just generally true. Universal judgments for Kant have a 
certain necessity to them, and he thinks for any such necessity there needs to 
be a ‘ground of necessity’. The reason why this is a worry is because Kant 
understands the “perpetual” in the idea of perpetual peace to involve some 
kind of universality or necessity, and so this necessity would require some 
sort of ground or guarantee. For Kant, we have only achieved perpetual 
peace if there will always be peace. And so Kant’s worry is that although the 
idea of perpetual peace is logically possible, it is not clear that it is really 
possible unless we can show that there could be some ground of necessity 
that is really possible.  
Now, one might think that it is clearly possible that for each moment 
in the future there was no war, and if this is possible then it is also trivially 
true that perpetual peace is possible. But for Kant, the fact that it is possible 
that in each moment in the future there could be no war, is not sufficient to 
show that perpetual peace is possible. This worry about moving from each 
judgment to always judgments is found elsewhere in Kant’s corpus. Thus, 
for example, in an unpublished fragment Kant argues that, "[i]t is possible in 
each throw of the dice that I roll a six, and just as possible as every other 
result; but it is not possible for me always roll a six because that would 
require a ground of necessity" (2005, # 7170 19:263, p.461, emphasis 
added). The thought here is that unless there is some “ground of necessity”, 
such as the dice being loaded, it might be possible for each throw of the dice 
to be a six for any arbitrarily large sequence of throws, but this is quite 
distinct from the claim that it is possible for all throws to be six. And this is 
analogous to the story Kant tells about perpetual peace: it is possible that at 
each moment in the future there is not war, but this does not entail that it is 
possible for there to be perpetual peace. To demonstrate the possibility of 
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perpetual peace we need to show the possibility of some ground of necessity, 
or what Kant calls a guarantee of peace.  
In his footnote to the dice passage Paul Guyer writes that "Kant's 
present argument is fallacious: that it is not necessary to roll a six, does not 
mean that it is impossible to do so" (Kant, 2005, p.609). But, I see no reason 
to think that Kant’s argument here is obviously fallacious and there at least 
two distinct motivations that might lie behind Kant’s claim in the dice 
passage. The first appeals to insights found in intuitionist logic, the second to 
probability theory.  
Firstly, Kant thinks that ‘each’ judgements do not entail ‘all’ 
judgments, for he thinks that ‘all’ judgments have a type of necessity that 
‘each’ judgments lack.10 Thus he is committed to the position that any 
‘always’ or ‘perpetual’ judgment involves some appeal to a mechanism, 
function or ground that will guarantee the necessity of the “always”.11 His 
motivations here is similar to the type of motivations that led to the 
development of intuitionistic logic, and finalistic conceptions of mathematics 
in the early 20th century. In classical logic the fact that there does not exist an 
x that is not p (¬∃x¬Px) entails the fact that all xs are p (∀xPx). In 
intuitionist logic this inference is not valid. So the intuitionist thinks that 
¬∃x¬Px and ¬∀xPx are consistent. And Kant, like the intuitionist, in both 
the dice passage and in Perpetual Peace seems to commit himself to the 
consistency of such judgments. One reason intuitionists in mathematics 
adopted such a position is because they thought that it was possible to prove 
that a property could fail to hold universally of numbers (for ‘all’ numbers) 
even though one could not construct a particular number for which it did not 
hold (for ‘each’ number one can find, the property holds). 12 We can apply 
                                                 
10 I am interpreting such ‘each’ judgments as ‘each and any judgments’, which I will 
argue are best thought of as negative existential judgments.  
11 Perhaps he is also thinking about issues connected to the relationship between a 
series, and what Leibniz called ‘the law of the series’. While it is clear that for any 
arbitrarily large sequence of rolls it is possible that each roll is a six, it is not clear 
that this entails that it is possible to always roll a six. It is not the series of number 
1/2, 1/4, 1/8 . . . that converges on 1, but the function. We can only say that this 
series converges on 1 because there is a function 'behind' the series that makes the 
series 'necessary'. The three dots only make sense because we understand the 
function, which is that for each member of the series, after the first, the denominator 
is twice that of the previous member. Similarly, to say that we will always roll a six 
is to think of the series 6, 6, 6 . . . It is to think that not only that (a)  each roll up to a 
certain point been a 6 (which for any moment is possible) but also that (b) every 
future roll will be a six. And that the thought 'every future x will be y' involves the 
idea of necessity. And this is perhaps why Kant thinks it requires a ground. 
12 Thus Stewart Shapiro explains that, “intuitionists agree that the proposition ∃x 
¬Px, entails the former ¬AxPx, but they balk at the converse because it is possible to 
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such a way of thinking to Kant’s argument in Perpetual Peace and in the 
dice passage if we interpret the “each” statements here as negative existential 
judgments. So with regard to the dice passage, Kant accepts that it is 
possible that each role of the dice is six, which I suggest interpreting as the 
claim that it is possible that there is not a role of the dice that is not six 
(¬∃x¬Px). However, he thinks that this does not entail that it is possible all 
roles are six (∀xPx). In order to establish this, one would need a ground of 
necessity. Similarly, in the case of perpetual peace, the fact that it is possible 
that at each moment in the future there will not be war (¬∃x¬Px )13 does not 
entail that perpetual peace (∀xPx) is possible.14 In order to show that 
perpetual peace is possible, one has to show that a ground of necessity is of 
such peace possible, and in this context he calls such a potential ground of 
necessity a ‘guarantee of perpetual peace’. Secondly, there are also 
arguments from probability theory that have been used to support a 
conclusion similar to Kant’s. For, standard probability theory tells us that the 
probability of always rolling a six is zero, and one might think that if 
something has a probability of zero it is impossible.15  
 One reason why this second worry is important is because one 
might think that it is obviously the case that it is possible that at each and 
any moment in the future there is not war, and one might think that this fact 
alone is enough to show that perpetual peace is possible, and so there is no 
need to provide any argument to prove the real possibility of perpetual 
peace. It seems clear that Kant accepts that it is possible that at each and any 
moment in the future there is not war. And so it is only because Kant is 
committed to something like the claim that ¬∃x¬Px does not entail ∀xPx 
that he thinks that we need to offer some argument for the possibility of 
perpetual peace.  
I suggest, then, that Kant’s appeal to a “guarantee” of peace in his 
essay is meant to address such worries about the possibility of perpetual 
                                                                                                                   
show that a property cannot hold universally without constructing a number for 
which it fails.” (p.9)  
13 “There isn’t a moment in which there is not-peace” 
14 It is not clear how to interpret Kant’s modal language here. Perhaps to explain this 
properly one would have to discuss modal intuitionist logic as the claim might seem 
to concern the consistency of  ◊¬∃x ¬Px and ¬◊∀xPx. These are consistent in the 
intuitionist version of S4 developed by Biermann and de Paiva (2000). But I think 
one does not really need to go in to intuitionistic logic in order to understand the 
relevance of intuitionist logic and mathematics for Kant’s position in perpetual 
peace. Perhaps one can understand Kant’s modal talk in these discussions in meta-
linguistic terms, rather than building it into the object language.  
15 There has been an interesting discussion of this question recently in Analysis. See, 
Williamson (2007) and Weintraub (2008) 
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peace, not to offer an account of its historical genesis. Kant’s aim in 
perpetual peace is to show what mechanisms could lead to the establishment 
of perpetual peace and to show that such mechanisms could in principle be 
created by beings like us, indeed even by a “nation of devils” (8.366). If he 
can do this he can show that Perpetual Peace is both possible and he can give 
some indication of what future changes are likely to be necessary conditions 
for such perpetual peace. If he is successful in showing both of these things 
then he has successfully shown that the idea of perpetual peace can function 
as a practical ideal. Thus, what Kant means by introducing the idea of a 
“guarantee” of peace is that we don’t need a world sovereign to guarantee 
world peace, for given certain conditions, namely the spread of democracy, 
the creation of international institutions and the globalization of trade 
relations, peaceful relations would be natural, and that these conditions could 
arise naturally, even given what we know of human nature. The emergence 
of such peace creating conditions is not however, inevitable. These 
conditions (and the peace they make possible) are not guaranteed to come 
into existence; but, Kant thinks, if they were to come into existence they 
would guarantee peace.16 This is what Kant means by a “guarantee” of 
perpetual peace in this context.  
Kant believes that there are three central philosophical questions: 
What can I know? What should I do? And, for what can I hope? When Kant 
suggests the world peace is something that could slowly develop through 
purely natural mechanisms he is neither being utopian nor arguing that world 
peace is the inevitable result of some laws of history carved in stone. Kant, 
                                                 
16 This distinction between two possible senses of guarantee is also noted by Henry 
Allison who argues that Kant uses the word simultaneously in both senses. Thus 
Allison argues, “A closer consideration of the guarantee, however, suggests that 
Kant’s claim is not as audacious as it might appear and that the differences between 
the account in Perpetual Peace and other texts are more rhetorical than substantive. 
The so-called guarantee has two grounds, only one of which is teleological. The 
first, non-teleological, ground is the reflection that the problem of finding a just 
political order must be soluble, since it does not require any moral change but is 
essentially a matter of technical rationality. This is the point that the reference to the 
nation of intelligent devils (the counterpart to Rousseau’s angels) is intended to 
underscore. But the fact that the problem is soluble for human reason does not of 
itself guarantee that it will be solved. Thus, the need for the second and properly 
teleological thesis that our nature, that is, our unsocial sociability, will compel the 
human race to find the solution. In short, the guarantee consists in pointing out that 
both capacity and motivation are present, which is sufficient to show that, contrary 
to the claims of the cynical political moralist, the end is attainable. Moreover, I do 
not think that Kant either intended or needed to claim more than this.” (Allison, 
pp.226-7) My suggestion is that Kant is only using the notion of a guarantee in the 
first of these senses.  
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on my reading is not a historical determinist who believes that there is an 
objective law of history, which possesses the same sort of status as other 
laws of nature, and that predicts political progress over time leading to the 
development of the rule of law both within and between states.17  Although 
he does hope it is the case that world history is progressive in this sense and 
also thinks that that in so far as we are moral beings we need to have such 
hope. So, on my interpretation, Kant’s aim in his historical writings is far 
more modest than attempting to defend a form of progressive historical 
determinism.  Instead, he merely wants to show that, given what we know of 
human nature, and to be honest a lot of what we know isn’t very nice, a 
world of independent sovereign states living together peacefully is 
something that we can realistically hope for and work to bring about. For he 
believes that in so far as we are moral we need to hope that there is will be 
progress in the political sphere, and thus the goal of his historical writings is 
merely to show that such hope is not unreasonable. And he thinks he can 
show the reasonableness of such hope if he can provide reasons to think that 
there are natural mechanisms that could produce such progress. Engaging in 
this Kantian project and trying to understand the natural mechanisms that 
could lead to such a state of affairs has at a number of positive motivations. 
It can help us avoid despair. In a world in which man is a wolf to man 
(Homo homini lupus), it is easy to give up hope about the possibility of 
achieving any sort of lasting peace between people or peoples. Especially in 
today’s world such despair seems difficult to avoid.18  
Having said this, my reading of the guarantee of peace passage is 
certainly compatible with Kant being a historical determinist in the strong 
sense I suggested above. For it might be the case that Kant believes both: (1) 
In order to be perpetual, peace would need a natural guarantee as a ground of 
necessity. And, (2) there is an objective law of history with the same status 
as other natural laws which guarantees that such a state of perpetual peace 
                                                 
17 In saying this I agree with Paul Guyer, who argues that, “the historiographical 
thesis of Perpetual Peace can be only the proposition that the natural history of 
mankind is compatible with the achievement of peace, not a claim that the history of 
mankind renders this achievement inevitable.” (Guyer, pp.411-2).  
18 In addition, as Aristotle pointed out, one of the main cause of war is the desire for 
peace. And Kant also recognizes that, “the desire of every state (or its ruler) to 
achieve lasting peace by . . . dominating the whole world, if at all possible.” (Kant, 
p.113) Such a desire is expressed by many world leaders, and often the motivation 
behind such a desire is the belief that peace is achievable in no other way, that the 
idea of a world federation of sovereign states governed by international law is an 
empty dream. Showing that how such an ideal could develop naturally, even if not 
inevitable, is one way of countering such despair. In addition, if we have a theory of 
the natural mechanisms and causes that tend to produce and maintain peace we can 
promote and encourage them. 
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will come about.  My primary claim in this discussion is that Kant’s appeal 
to a guarantee in Perpetual Peace should be understood in the first and not 
the second sense, and so should not be taken at textual evidence that Kant is 
a historical determinist in something like the second sense. But my reading 
of what Kant means by a guarantee in this context is perfectly compatible 
with him also being a historical determinist in the strong sense suggested. A 
proper understanding of Kant’s attitude to this second question would 
involve thorough examination of his essay Idea for a Universal History with 
a Cosmopolitan Aim and the Appendix to the Critique of the Teleological 
Power of Judgment. The Universal History essay is particularly important as 
this is his first published work in which he suggests that a federation of 
nations would have to come into existence as a ground for perpetual peace.19 
And this essay can be read as defending a form of historical determinism in 
suggesting that there are natural forces, and in particular what the calls the 
“unsocial sociability” of humanking, that will lead to the development of 
such an international order.  
Now, this is not the main topic of this paper, but before moving I 
will make two quick points about the Universal History (1784) essay. This 
essay was published more than ten years before Perpetual Peace (1795), and 
in between Kant wrote the Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790), 
                                                 
19 Thus Kant writes that “(n)ature has therefore once again used the incompatibility 
of human beings, even of great societies and state bodies of this kind of creature as a 
means to seek out in their unavoidable antagonism a condition of tranquility and 
safety; i.e. through wars, through the overstrained and never ceasing process of 
armament for them, through the condition of need that due to this finally every state 
even in the midst of peace must feel internally, toward at first imperfect attempts, 
but finally after many devastations, reversals and even thoroughgoing exhaustion of 
their powers, nature drives them to what reason could have told them even without 
much sad experience: namely, to go beyond a lawless condition of savages and enter 
into a federation of nations,4 where every state, even the smallest, could expect its 
security and rights not from its own might, or its own juridical judgment, but only 
from this great federation of nations (Foedus Amphictyonum), from a united might 
and from the decision in accordance with laws of its united will.”(2007, 8:24, p. 114, 
emphasis added) And similarly to the argument in Perpetual Peace he suggests that 
such peace would require the existence of two conditions (the internal constitution 
of all states is republican, and they form themselves into a federation) that could 
serve as a ground of the necessity of the peace. Thus he argues that, “finally, partly 
through the best possible arrangement of their civil constitution internally, partly 
through a common agreement and legislation externally, a condition is set up, 
which, resembling a civil commonwealth, can preserve itself like an automaton.” 
(2007, 8:25, p.115, emphasis added). I take it that this reference to the international 
order preserving itself like an automaton his way of stressing the necessity of such a 
perpetual peace, which requires some underlying mechanism to keep it place. So I 
take this passage to be a forerunner of the guarantee discussion in Perpetual Peace.    
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where he worked out his view on teleology in nature in more depth. In 
addition during this period Kant actively followed the revolution and 
following terror in France. So, it is quite possible that his views on history 
and progress changed quite significantly between these two texts. Having 
said this, I think that the position defended in the Universal History essay is 
broadly compatible with the position I have attributed to him in Perpetual 
Peace, and that neither essay should be read as advocating historical 
determinism, but instead should be read as acting in the service of rational 
hope, by giving us reason to think that a hope in historical progress is not 
unreasonable. Thus, Kant claims towards the end of the Universal History 
essay that,  
nature perhaps needs an immense series of generations, each of 
which transmits its enlightenment to the next, in order finally to 
propel its germs in our species to that stage of development 
which is completely suited to its aim. And this point in time 
must be, at least in the idea of the human being, the goal of his 
endeavors, because otherwise the natural predispositions would 
have to be regarded for the most part as in vain and purposeless; 
which would remove all practical principles and thereby bring 
nature, whose wisdom in the judgment of all remaining 
arrangements must otherwise serve as a principle, under the 
suspicion that in the case of the human being alone it is a 
childish play. (2007, 8:19, p.110)  
Kant makes it clear here that our belief is a progressive history is a 
demand of practical reason, rather than of theoretical reason. It seems to be 
something like what in the Critique of Practical Reason he will call a 
postulate of practical reason. If we do not believe in progress then this will, 
Kant thinks, lead to a form of moral despair, which will undermine our 
moral capacities, and so we have a moral reason to hope in the possibility of 
a progressive history.  I suggest, then, that the claims in both Perpetual 
Peace and Universal History which seem to defend a form of historical 
determinism are best read in this light as merely telling a story which allows 
us to hope in the possibility of such progress and in so doing avoid moral 
despair. Kant makes it clear that his aim is to provide a remedy to moral 
despair towards the end of the Universal History essay when he claims, 
Such a justification of nature – or better, of providence - is no 
unimportant motive for choosing a particular viewpoint for 
considering the world. For what does it help to praise the 
splendor and wisdom of creation in the non-rational realm of 
nature, and to recommend it to our consideration, if that part of 
the great showplace of the highest wisdom that contains the end 
of all this - the history of humankind - is to remain a ceaseless 
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objection against it, the prospect of which necessitates our 
turning our eyes away from it in disgust and, in despair of ever 
encountering a completed rational aim in it, to hope for the 
latter only in another world? (2007. 8:30, p.119)  
Three conditions of lasting peace 
At the heart of his essay Kant introduces what he calls three “definitive 
articles” for the establishment of perpetual peace. These are the conditions 
that Kant believes, if realized, will make lasting peaceful relations between 
states possible. They are the conditions that if they were in place would 
guarantee a lasting peace. The first two stress the need for individual states 
to be republics and for the creation of a federation of such states. In addition 
he also argues that the deepening of economic trade relations between states 
will also be conducive to peace. These are the three factors stressed in the 
preamble to the United Nations charter.  
Kant’s first article is that “The civil constitution in every state shall 
be republican.” (1996, 8:350, p.322) And it seems that what Kant calls a 
republic is very close to what we would call a liberal democracy. Thus he 
explains that what he calls a republic is based upon three principles: “first on 
principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as individuals), 
second on principles of the dependence of all upon a single common 
legislation (as subjects), and third on the law of their equality (as citizens of 
a state)” (1996, 8:350-1, p.322). Kant’s suggestion that only republics are 
capable of establishing lasting peaceful relations has come to be know as the 
theory of democratic peace. Kant has a number of arguments for suggesting 
that republics are likely to establish lasting peaceful relations. He believes 
that most wars are started by leaders for their own benefit and that wars 
(especially between republics) are not to the benefit of citizens, and so 
citizens in a republic, unlike princes, will be hesitant in engaging in wars.20 
He also suggests that that in republics, at least over time, there will emerge a 
public culture of respect for law and that this will spread to relations with 
other states, or at least to other republics. 
                                                 
20 “When the consent of the citizens of a state is required in order to decide whether 
there shall be war or not (and it cannot be otherwise in this constitution), nothing is 
more natural than that they will be very hesitant to begin such a bad game, since 
they would have to decide to take upon themselves all the hardships of war (such as 
themselves doing the fighting and paying the costs of the war from their own 
belongings, painfully making good the devastation it leaves behind, and finally - to 
make the cup of troubles overflow - a burden of debt that embitters peace itself, and 
that can never be paid off because of new wars always impending)” (1996, 8:351, 
p.323-4.) 
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In recent years21 there have been a large number of statistical  studies 
on the thesis of democratic peace, and the consensus seems to be that liberal 
democracies are, historically less likely to engage in military conflicts with 
one another than other types of regimes although they are often aggressive in 
their relations with other types of regimes. However, there are exceptions. 
For example, one can point to the British-American wars and the Spanish-
American war as examples of republics going to war with one another. 
However defenders of the Kantian thesis have argued that lasting peace is 
only likely between mature democracies that have had the chance to learn 
from their international experience and where respect for the rule of law has 
been firmly established.22 And a defender of the Kantian thesis could also 
point out that these wars occurred in the 19th century before the creation of 
serious international institutions. Even if there is some empirical evidence to 
suggest that republics are statistically less likely to go to war with each other 
than non-republics, our experience in the 20th and 21st Centuries of how 
populations in democracies can be whipped up by populist leaders into mobs 
driven into war fever by rabid nationalism, the Kantian optimism here seems 
questionable. At the very least he seems to have underestimated the capacity 
for citizens in republics to be driven by nationalistic rhetoric and fervor.  
Kant’s second article is that “The right of nations shall be based on a 
federalism of free states.” (1996, 8:354, p.325). Thus he argues that, “right 
cannot be decided by war and its favorable outcome, victory; and by a peace 
pact a current war can be brought to an end but not a condition of war” 
(1996, 8:356, p. 327) And that peace “cannot be instituted or assured without 
a pact of nations among themselves, a direct duty; so there must be a league 
of a special kind, which can be called a pacific league (foedus pacificum), 
and what would distinguish it from a peace pact (pactum pacis) is that the 
latter seeks to end only one war whereas the former seeks to end all war 
forever.” (1996, 8:356, p. 327) And he adds that if the concept of the right of 
nations is to retain any meaning it must be “necessarily connected” with a 
federation of this kind” (1996, 8:356, p.328). Thus, Kant argues that 
although peace and international law doesn’t require the existence of a world 
state it does require international institutions and agreements. Although Kant 
is not fully clear about his motivations here, it seems plausible to suppose 
that one of the main functions of such institutions is to make the rights and 
duties of states towards one another public and clear.  
In addition, Kant also suggests that economic growth and trade are 
also natural factors that make lasting peace between nations possible, 
suggesting that globalization, in enmeshing nations in a web of trading 
                                                 
21 Following the publication of the influential Doyle (1983). 
22 See Cederman (2001). 
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relations may also encourage lasting peace. Thus, he point to, “the spirit of 
commerce, which cannot coexist with war and which sooner or later takes 
hold of every nation.” (1996, 3:368, pp.336-7). Once again the development 
of the international arms trade and the way in which such a trade fuels wars, 
tells against Kant’s optimism here, although global trade relations do also 
provide some disincentives to war.  
What Kant is suggesting then is that lasting peace would be possible 
between a federation of republics enmeshed in a web of trading relations.  
Kant himself suggests these three factors could emerge naturally, and that 
combined will allow for the establishment of world peace without the 
existence of a world sovereign. Firstly, he believes republics, or what we 
would perhaps call liberal democracies, are naturally inclined to live 
peacefully together. Secondly, in order for international peace to be 
established international law must be established and this is only possible 
given the creation of international institutions, such as the United Nations. 
And thirdly international trade relations will also tend to encourage peace. 
Kant is not arguing that there is a law of history that requires that 
such a state of affairs. He is not arguing that democratization and the growth 
of international institutions and trade are inevitable. Rather he is arguing that 
a world of liberal democracies engaged in mutual trade relations and 
regulated by international institutions is likely to be a peaceful world and 
that such a world, is not a utopian ideal but something that could emerge 
naturally and that we can and should work to bring about.23 
On Kant, Neo-conservatives and Revolutions 
Let us assume that Kant is right and that a world federation of republics is 
both possible and desirable. What can we do to help bring it about? Here I 
believe there is a tension between Kant’s two articles: for Kant believes that 
in order to achieve lasting peace we need to encourage both 
democratization/liberalization and the strengthening of international 
institutions and international law. However, as recent world events have 
shown, these two liberal imperatives often seem to conflict. It seems that we 
must often choose between strengthening international institutions and 
                                                 
23 Before explaining what is meant by these three requirements let me briefly refer 
back to the preamble to the United Nations charter that I quoted at the start of this 
paper, for it seems clear that the charter is alluding to these three factors. If we 
remember: the aim of the United Nations is to save the “succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war” and, if Kant is right, then doing this will involve 
encouraging the spread of human rights (the republican constitution requirement), 
establishing conditions under which there is respect for international law (the 
international institutions requirement) and promoting economic growth and relations 
(the trade requirement). 
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international law or working for democratization and respecting human 
rights in particular countries. We must choose between respecting the rights 
of individuals and the rights of states. What policy should democracies 
support if they are faced with a dictator or despotic regime, but the only way 
to overthrow this regime is to engage in unilateral action that undermines 
international law or international institutions. Nothing I have said about 
Kant’s views up until this point help us to answer this question because if he 
is right that establishing lasting peace and justice involves both encouraging 
democratization and the nurturing of international institutions then it seems 
that a Kantian case could be made for democratic powers to use their 
military might to overthrow dictatorships and impose democratic regimes 
through military intervention. Indeed these were precisely the arguments 
made by many American neo-conservatives for regime change in the run-up 
to the invasion of Iraq. Their reasoning went: Invade Iraq, make it a 
democracy, and the other Arab states will democratize around it and we’ll 
have peace in the middle east. It seems, then, that the Kantian theory of the 
democratic peace was one of the main arguments to justify the US invasion 
of Iraq. And many ‘liberal interventionists’ use similar, seemingly Kantian, 
arguments to justify wars. What would Kant have to say about this? 
Now one argument against such a position, as made forcibly by Kofi 
Anan in the summer of 2003, is that democracy cannot be introduced by 
force. Now in general this seems to be a plausible claim, but there are 
exceptions that defenders of such regime change can point to. For example, 
the defenders of the possibility of spreading democracy often point to the 
experiences of Germany and Japan after the second world war. However, 
even if there are exceptions, it does seem to be true, as the current 
experience in Iraq makes clear, that at the very least introducing democracy 
through external force is extremely difficult. 
Kant’s own answer to this question is quite clear, however, for even 
if it were possible to introduce democracy by force, he believes that a respect 
for international law and institutions should trump our dislike of despotic 
regimes, for the proper remedy for despotism is internal reform or revolution 
not external intervention. For even if our international institutions are 
imperfect, we are better off with some institutions rather than none. 24  
                                                 
24 And those who advocate unilateral interventions to make the world a safer place 
are, then, in Kant’s eyes the equivalent of international Jacobins. Thus, towards the 
end of his essay Kant makes a few remarks about the relationship between morality 
and politics and on the justice of revolutions. This essay was written 6 years into the 
French Revolution and in many ways Kant was a big fan of the revolution as a 
natural event, however he thought that morally one can never have a right to revolt, 
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Thus Kant argues that in terms of “the external relations of states, it 
cannot be demanded of a state that it give up its constitution even though this 
is a despotic one” (1996, 8:373, p.340) and he justifies this claim by arguing 
for what he calls ‘permissive laws of reason’ that “allow a situation of public 
right afflicted with injustice to continue until everything has either of itself 
become ripe for a complete overthrow or has been made almost ripe by 
peaceful means; for some rightful constitution or other, even if it is only to a 
small degree in conformity with right, is better than none at all, which latter 
fate (anarchy) a premature reform would meet with.” (1996, 8:374, p.341)25 
Our states and our international institutions are not perfect, but they are all 
we have if we care about the rule of law. 
Again I suggest that Kant is probably right in this. International law 
and institutions are in their infant stages but will only grow into mature 
institutions if they are allowed to function and this involves us being willing 
to accept some of the inevitable mistakes they make. Looking at the 
cumbersome functioning of the United Nations at the present time, with the 
difficulty the organization has in making any meaningful decisions must be 
very frustrating for any well-meaning leaders (and let us assume for the sake 
of argument that such individuals exist). But the desire to bypass such a 
cumbersome decision making process and act unilaterally for the sake of the 
grater good is a bit like the temptation a well meaning parent faces when she 
sees her child struggling with his schoolwork. But the well meaning parent 
who does her child’s schoolwork for him because she knows she will do a 
better job, ultimately never allows him to develop his own talents and mature 
into an adult himself. Now, of course, the consequences of a child’s mistakes 
are far less serious than the consequences of the failures of the young 
international community. Thus, for example, even many critics of liberal 
interventionism think that the international community made a real mistake 
in not intervening to stop the genocide in Rawanda. And in such cases of 
humanitarian emergencies I believe that a case can be made unilateral extra-
legal action. For example, David Scheffer one of the chief architects of the 
Clinton policy in Bosnia and a serious believer in the international rule of 
law, has argued that such cases should be thought of as analogous to the 
situation where an individual sees a crime in progress and can only stop it by 
                                                                                                                   
because morality demands that we do everything we can to encourage and nurture 
the rule of law and revolutions are, for him the overthrow of all law. 
25 And Kant continues by adding that, “Thus political wisdom, in the condition in 
which things are at present, will make reforms in keeping with the ideal of public 
right its duty; but it will use revolutions, where nature of itself has brought them 
about, not to gloss over an even greater oppression, but as a call of nature to bring 
about by fundamental reforms a lawful constitution based on principles of freedom, 
the only kind that endures” (1996, 8:374, p.341). 
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‘taking the law into his own hands’. Such behavior is often extra-legal but is 
not, necessarily, inimical to the rule of law. But apart from such cases of 
humanitarian intervention, I think that the Kantian should reject the call for 
war in the name of peace. 26 
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